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Recent advances in the theory of financial intermediation have enhanced our
understanding of the special role of bank loans in funding corporate investments.  Much of the
benefit from bank loans is generated by the specialized monitoring and information gathering
role provided by financial institutions, including their role in facilitating the reorganization of
firms experiencing financial distress.  Despite these numerous benefits, it is somewhat surprising
that aggregate trends suggest that the corporate sector has decreased its reliance on bank loans.
Kaufman (1991) discusses the factors which have diminished the role of the banking
sector in the U.S. economy.  Bank regulations, such as restrictions on geographic locations and
product offerings, limit the ability of banks to compete.  These constraints became especially
onerous as advances in communications and technology lowered the innovation costs of other
forms of financing.  The net impact of these events was that  the benefits of bank monitoring
were being eroded by improvements in the financing alternatives available to corporations
directly through the capital markets.
In addition, as the relative importance of international commerce increased, foreign banks
expanded into the U.S. to provide services to their commercial customers.  Frankel and
Montgomery (1991) provide an interesting perspective on changes in the international banking
sector.  They note that, as foreign banks expanded, they were not subject to the same constraints
as U.S. banks.  This asymmetry allowed foreign banks to provide products and services that
differed from the offerings of U.S. banks.  Consequently, U.S. banks lost their traditional loan
business to innovations in the capital markets (e.g., commercial paper, junk bonds) as well as to
less-constrained foreign bank competitors.  This suggests that the degree of competition as well
as the manner in which banks form and preserve customer relationships are crucial determinants
of performance.3
There has, however, been very little formal analysis of this phenomenon.  We model this
problem by investigating the relationship between alternative bank monitoring policies and
corporate investment and financing decisions.  We choose to examine this relationship because
of the delegated monitoring role provided by banks [see, e.g., Diamond (1984)].  The limitation
of existing studies is that, while they explain the special economic service provided by banks,
they do not typically describe how the size of the banking sector evolves through time, nor how
changes in bank policy impact the efficiency of managerial decision-making.  The main idea in
this paper is that regulatory and competitive factors constrain the reaction of banks to changes in
the economic environment.  One plausible means of adapting to these changes is that banks alter
some aspect of their monitoring policies.  Thus, rather than taking the monitoring characteristics
of the bank as fixed, we examine the effects of changes in bank monitoring policies on corporate
investment and financing decisions.  This analysis then provides us with very specific insights
about how the banking sector evolves through time, and what the likely real and capital market
consequences of such changes might be.
It is unlikely that changes in bank monitoring policies provide a complete explanation of
the variation in the size of the banking sector.  Berlin (1991) investigates the hypothesis that the
size of the banking sector varies due to a bank's specialized role in restructuring troubled credits.
He argues that the incentive for firms to borrow from banks depends on the likelihood of, and
perceived benefits from, restructuring versus the costs generated by the capacity constraints that
banks face in rescheduling loans.  In reality, the special role of banks is undoubtedly a function of
several important services that they provide, including information generation as well as loan
workout specialists [see, e.g., Campbell and Kracaw (1980)].  Thus, we view the analysis in this
paper as complementary to that contained in Berlin (1991).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
2. The Base Case Model4
The original insight that describes depository-type financial intermediaries as delegated
monitors is contained in Diamond (1984).  In order to fully analyze the properties of the
delegated monitor, the extant literature exogenously characterizes the monitor with a particular
set of attributes.  For example, the monitor typically utilizes a deterministic verification policy to
observe information at a fixed cost.  The monitor is assumed to fully observe the firm's private
information without error.  There has been little analysis of the optimal combination of
monitoring properties, and we do not pursue this issue in this paper.  Rather, we show how
changes in each of the properties of the monitor described above impact corporate investment
and financing decisions.  This approach then allows us to characterize how changes in bank
monitoring policies ultimately impact the relative size of the banking sector.
The construct of our base case model is similar to the structure described in Seward
(1990).  We consider a single period model where the firm has access to two separate, perfectly
divisible investment projects.  Let Ij represent the amount of capital allocated to production
process j.  An investment of I1 in Project 1 generates an end-of-period state-contingent cash flow
of X(I1,s), where
(1) X(I1, s) = k(I1)  (1 + R1(s))
Similarly, an investment of I2 in project 2 produces cash flow of Y(I2, s), where
(2) Y(I2, s) = g(I2)  (1 + R2(s))
In this representation, the deterministic scale functions g(•) and k(•) are assumed to be concave
and twice differentiable in their arguments.  We assume that g'(0) = k'(0) = ∞ where the prime
denotes the derivative.  In order to facilitate our subsequent characterization of the delegated
monitor's verification policy, we assume that the firm's marginal aggregate output is increasing
across the states of nature.  The random multiplicative shock term for production process j, (1 +5
Rj(s)), depends on the state of nature s, which is an outcome from the universal set, U.  We
assume that the firm's production process is additively separable.  Hence, the firm's aggregate
cash flow, W(I,s),  is the sum of the cash flows from each of the firm's investment projects:
(3) W(I, s)= X(I1, s)  +  Y(I2, s)
There are two sources of post-contracting moral hazard in our model.  First, the firm's
realized cash flow is only partially observable by outside investors.  In particular, outsiders can
costlessly observe the cash flow component X(I1, s), but can observe the cash flow Y(I2, s) only
by expending resources to verify managerial statements about the realization of Y(I2, s). Since a
policy of verification in all states of nature would be prohibitively costly, one goal of the firm's
financial contracting decision is to establish an efficient outside verification policy.  The second
problem which confronts outside investors is that, while they can observe the firm's aggregate
investment level, the allocation of capital across investment projects is unobservable.  As a
result, outside investors cannot observe the relative allocation of funds to projects 1 and 2.  This
distinction matters to outside investors because Project 1 is riskier than Project 2, in the sense
described by the following assumption:
(4) 1 + R1(s) = 1 + R2(s) + z(s), where ÚU z(s) p(s) ds   =   0
In our framework, p(s) describes the unique state-claim prices in our complete market setting.
Expression (4) states that the first project is a "mean-preserving" and "price-preserving" spread of
the second project.  It is in this relative sense that the first project is riskier than the second
project.  Table 1 summarizes the relevant characteristics of the firm's investment projects.
Outside investors can verify the realization of the second project, Y (I2, s), through a
costly monitoring technology.  Our base case model allows outside investors access to a
deterministic monitoring technology with perfect observability.  Furthermore, the cost of6
verification, w, is initially assumed to be fixed.  This type of monitoring policy impacts the firm's
contracting problem because the return realized by outside investors depends on whether
verification occurs.  In the absence of a costly verification, insiders would declare a low
realization of the unobservable return component of the firm's aggregate cash flow stream.
However, excessive verification policies can be costly for two reasons.  First, verification entails
the expenditure of resources.  Second, since verification occurs only in the set of states where
default occurs, an increase in the firm's debt level induces insiders to adopt riskier investment
policies.  Thus, in this framework, private information allows insiders to benefit from the
consumption of unobservable cash flows while private action transfers wealth to insiders from
the firm's bondholders.  In part, the firm's contracting decisions must balance these two agency
problems.
The payoff due to the outside investors at the end of the period can be described as
follows.  Let a(b) represent the observable characteristics of the contractual claim held by the
outside investors in the set of states where monitoring occurs (does not occur).  Let S describe
the set of outcomes over which a verification occurs.  Then the payment due to the outside
investors can be described by the following schedule:
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where Sc is the complement of S and hence represents the set of outcomes over which
monitoring does not occur.  Finally, let E represent the insiders' initial equity contribution to the
firm, and let  F represent the total amount of capital which insiders can allocate across the firm's
set of investment projects.  Then the firm's investment and financing problem can be written as:7
6 Maximize S
c   XI1, s    YI2, s    Kb, XI1, s ps  ds
   F,I1,I2,a,b
                S
 XI1, s    YI2, s    Ca, XI1, s,  YI2 ,s ps  ds
subject to
7 0    P    XI1, s    YI2, s,
8     F    S
 Ca, XI1, s,  YI2, s    wps  ds
 S
c Kb, XI1, s ps  ds    E
9 I argmax  S
 XI1, s    YI2, s    Ca, XI1, s, YI2, s ps  ds
            I  O
 S
c XI1, s    YI2, s    Kb, XI1, s ps  ds
       subject  to
10 I1    I2    F,
11 Kb, XI1, s, Ca, XI1, s, YI2, s 	  0.
In this formulation, the firm's management implements investment and financing policies
which maximize the value of the insiders' wealth.  Because the optimal sharing rule depends on
whether outsiders verify the realization of the unobservable cash flow stream, insiders' wealth
depends upon the nature of their residual claim and their ability to consume "perks".  The
opportunity for the latter arises in those states where outsiders choose not to monitor, and
insiders claim that realized cash flow is less than its actual outcome.  Equations (7) and (11)8
describe non-negativity constraints on the payoffs from the firm's financial claims.  Hence, these
conditions impose limited liability restrictions on the set of feasible distributions.  Equation (8) is
a rationality condition which states that investors do not overpay for the firm's financial
securities, despite the moral hazard.  Finally, equation (9) is the incentive compatibility condition
which states that investment decisions by insiders are made to maximize their own personal
benefit.
The solution to the insiders' programming problem provides a characterization of the
optimal investment decision, financing choices, and verification strategy.  We now briefly
discuss each of these policy decisions.
A. Investment
The assumption that investment decisions can be made after the firm has completed its
financing plans creates the possibility that the allocation of fund may disproportionately benefit
insiders.  Thus, taking as given the firm's scale and capital structure, we consider the mix of
investment projects undertaken by the firm.
The relative allocation of capital across the firm's investment projects is determined by
analyzing the first-order condition for the insiders' programming problem.  Let (ˆ  I  1 , ˆ  I 2 ) solve the
programming problem (6) - (11).  In order to describe the allocation of capital among the set of
investment projects undertaken by the firm, we form the ratio of marginal scale products.  After
some simplification, the investment allocation decision solves the following:
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Here, J(s) is an indicator function for the event that the firm is not monitored.  Subsequently, J(s)
will also indicate that the firm is solvent.  This relationship will provide the base case investment
allocation benchmark against which we subsequently compare other investment decisions under
alternative monitoring policies.  Equation (12) indicates that two factors influence the relative
proportion of investment capital allocated to Project 1.  Either an increase in the present value of
the project's random shock term, or a decrease in the marginal payoff to outside claimants in the
non-bankrupt states per dollar of cash flow from the risky, observable project increases the firm's
investment in Project 1.  Conversely, an increase in the present value of the second project's
random shock term increases the insiders' investment in Project 2.
B. Monitoring
The extant literature typically assumes an equivalence between verification by the
monitor and the event of bankruptcy.  That is, monitoring of private information occurs in those
states where the firm is unable to repay its debt obligations.  As discussed in Seward (1990),
however, the interpretation of the verification region as the set of states where bankruptcy occurs
holds only in certain cases.  However, in order to facilitate the comparison of our results with
other studies, we will assume that verification occurs only in the set of states where the firm
declares bankruptcy.  Seward (1990) shows that the contract K (•, •, •, ) takes the form of the
standard debt obligation.  Let D represent the face value for the firm's pure discount debt
obligation.  In this case, the verification region is defined by the relationship:
(13) D    =    X(I1, s )  +  Y(I2, s )10
where s  defines the lower bound on the set of states where a verification does not occur.  Hence,
the state s  also defines the minimum report to outside investors for outcomes in the non-
verification region.  This relationship simply states that, for a firm which has a maturing debt
obligation with face value D, the optimal monitoring policy involves verification in any state
where the firm declares bankruptcy.  Thus, in our model, the firm's choice of debt financing will
simultaneously determine the verification region.  Since delegated monitoring reduces the
duplication costs of verification and we have posited an equivalence between bankruptcy and
verification, then all of the debt in our framework will be in the form of bank loans (i.e., no
publicly-traded corporate bonds).  Thus, there is an equivalence between the amount of corporate
debt financing and the size of the financial intermediary sector in our model.  Higher debt levels
increase the set of states over which the private information problem is resolved, but also reduces
the firm's reliance on outside equity.  Since it is the latter which mitigates the insiders' risk-
shifting incentives, the choice of an optimal monitoring policy is quite complex.
C. Financing
In our framework, the form of the firm's financial contracts is important because it can
reduce the investment distortions that arise from private action and private information.  Since
we have assumed that monitoring occurs in each bankruptcy state, the face value of the firm's
debt contract is important because it determines the verification region.  An increase in the face
value of the firm's debt is beneficial because verification enhances the observability of the firm's
cash flow.  This incremental benefit is somewhat offset by the cost of verification, so that the
optimal monitoring strategy depends on several factors in our model.
Corporate insiders can also obtain investment capital from outside equity claimants in our
framework.  Again, utilizing the first-order conditions for the insiders' programming problem, the
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The interpretation of the relationship described by (14) is relatively straightforward.  The left
hand side is the ratio of outside equity ownership to inside equity ownership.  The right hand side
indicates that the optimal ownership percentages depend on two covariances.  The first, which is
described by the integral in the numerator, is the covariability between the idiosyncratic risk of
Project 1 and the event of bankruptcy.  The second, described by the integral in the denominator,
is the covariability between the second project's random shock term and the event of bankruptcy.
Assuming both covariances are positive, a higher value of the numerator covariance and a lower
value of the second covariance increases the ownership percentage of the outside equity
claimants.  Note also that, when the covariances have the same sign, outsiders will optimally
control a majority of the firm's equity.  Equation (14), in conjunction with equation (13),
describes the firm's financing decisions in our base case scenario.
3. The Role of Imperfect Observability
In this section, we extend our basic results to examine two related issues.  First, we
characterize the impact of imperfect verification on the firm's investment and financial
contracting policies.  We also investigate the impact of imperfect observability on the formation
of financial intermediaries.  In general, relative to the alternative of choosing not to contract with
the monitor, the introduction of imperfect observability produces two opposing effects on the
welfare of the contracting parties.  First, since the information generated by the monitor is
imperfect, an additional source of uncertainty is introduced into the principal-agent contracting
problem.  The risk preferences of the contracting parties may be such that this additional
uncertainty reduces welfare.  However, the incorporation of an "informative" (albeit imperfect)
monitoring technology tends to motivate managerial actions which subsequently improve the12
welfare of corporate insiders and outside investors.  Thus, despite the introduction of this
additional source of uncertainty, the potential for welfare gains provides the incentive to design
contracts which incorporate the outcome of the imperfect monitoring technology.
We consider an imperfect monitoring technology of the form:
(15) Z(I2,s)  =  Y(I2,s)  +  n (I2,s)
where
16   n I2,s  ps  ds   O
This formulation expresses the notion that the observability problems that arise in this framework
are a function of the firm's investment allocation to the unobservable project as well as the state
of nature.  It also states that, over the entire state-space, the economic impact of the observability
problem is neutral.  Corporate insiders can costlessly observe Y (•, •), while a costly verification
reveals Z (•, •) to the outside investors.  This additional source of uncertainty is factored into the
amount of investment capital which outside investors are willing to commit to the firm, as well
as the structural form of the financial contracts.  This occurs because actual observation errors in
any particular state have different impacts on each group of agents.  In particular, the firm's
investment and financial contracting decisions are chosen to solve the following programming
problem:13
17 Maximize S
c X I1, s    Y I2, s    K b, X I1, s ps  ds
      I1,I2a,b,F
 S
 X I1, s    Y I2, s    C a, X I1, s,  Z I2, s ps  ds
subject to
18 O    P    X I1, s    Y I2, s
19  F    S
 C a, X I1, s,  Z I2, s     p s  ds 
 S
c K 	, X I1, s  ps  ds    E
20   I  
 argmax  S
c X I1 , s    Y I2 ,s     K 	, X I1 , s ps  ds
I  0
subject to
21 I1    I2    F
22 K, XI1,s, C, XI1,s, YI2,s     0
The incremental effect introduced by imperfect observability can be seen by examining
equations (18) and (20).  Since costly verification reveals the outcome Z(I2,s) to outside
investors, the contractual claim in the set of states where monitoring occurs will be imperfectly
related to the true cash flow realization from the firm's unobservable project, Y(I2,s).
Now, for analytical convenience, we can decompose the observability error term, n(I2,s),
into a deterministic and a random component.  In particular, we shall assume:1
(23) n(I2,s)  =  g(I2) R3(s)
                                                
1 From Equation (12), we then have that   R3(s) p(s) ds   =   O.  Thus the real and financial
effects of imperfect observability arise because insiders consider its impact only in the set of
states where a verification occurs.14
The impact of imperfect observability on corporate investment and financing decisions can be
determined by analyzing the first-order conditions for the manager's programming problem (18) -
(22).  The following proposition summarizes the impact of imperfect observability on managerial
investment incentives.
Proposition 1: Imperfect observability by the monitor leads to over- (under-) investment
in the risky project,
 g  ˆ  I 2  
 k  ˆ  I  1 
     >    (<)     
 g  I 2 
 k  I  1 
when the covariance term (R3(s), J(s)) is positive (negative).
Proof:  See Appendix 1
Thus, relative to the case of perfect observability by the monitor, the incremental
investment effects induced by imperfect observability depend on the covariance between the
random error component, R3(s), and the set of states where a verification occurs.  Insiders prefer
to invest in projects whose payoffs are positively correlated with the set of states where no
verification occurs.  Thus, when observation errors are positively correlated with the event of
verification (bankruptcy), insiders increase their proportional investment in the unobservable,
low risk project.  The intuition is that, since insiders care about returns in the solvency states,
when Cov (R3(s), J(s)) is negative then outsiders underestimate the unobserved cash flow
component in the non-bankrupt states.  Note that while the primary impact of imperfect
observability is to exacerbate the private information problem, the secondary effect is that it also
influences the relative importance of the risk shifting problem.  From the perspective of the firm's
management, imperfect observability alters the gains available from investing in projects subject
to private information problems relative to the wealth transfers that accrue from risk shifting.15
This characterization suggests an interesting distinction among investment projects whose
returns are subject to private information problems.  Typically, there is no linkage between the
firm's financial condition and the severity of the information problems confronting outside
investors.  However, in the case of imperfect observability, investment distortions depend
importantly on the correlation between the firm's solvency and observation errors by the monitor.
As Proposition 1 demonstrates, when the monitor's verification reveals that the cash flow from
the low risk, unobservable project is higher (lower) than actual cash flow in the bankruptcy
states, the incentive to under- (over-) invest in risky projects exists.  Thus, when private
information problems arise, it is important to consider when observation errors are likely to
occur.  Thus, for example, the incentive for insiders to adopt riskier investments as the firm nears
financial distress may not be universal.  The intuition is that, for certain types of assets, the
wealth transfers available from risk shifting are outweighed by the welfare losses from
consumption of perks.  Thus, assets whose values are more likely to be overestimated in
distressed situations are less likely to be subject to risk-shifting problems.
Imperfect observability also impacts the optimal mix of inside and outside equity
ownership.  The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 2: Imperfect observability by the monitor leads to increased (decreased)
reliance on outside equity ownership,
b 
1 b  
     >    (<)     
ˆ  b 
1 ˆ  b  
when the term covariance R3(s), J(s) is positive (negative).
Proof:      See Appendix 216
When the monitor's observation error is positively correlated with the set of states where there is
no verification, Proposition 1 establishes that the proportional allocation of the firm's budget to
the risky project increases.  Since this investment incentive exacerbates the risk shifting problem,
the intuitive financial contracting adjustment is to increase the firm's reliance on outside equity.
By increasing the firm's reliance on outside equity, the insiders mitigate the secondary effect of
increasing the risk of the firm's investment projects.  In our framework, this effect occurs because
a shift in the firm's investment allocation toward the observable project also increases the firm's
commitment to risky production technologies.
Consider the case where the covariance described in Propositions 1 and 2.  We know
that, relative to the case of perfect observability, the firm will increase its investment in the
observable, risky project and its reliance on outside equity.  How does imperfect observability
affect the firm's scale decision and the verification policy?  Establishing the size of the
verification region is important here because it determines the set of states over which insiders
benefit from their investment decisions.  Holding the firm's scale decision fixed, the impact of
imperfect observability on the size of the financial intermediary sector again depends on the
correlation between  R3(s)  and  J(s).  When the covariance is positive, Proposition 2 establishes
that the firm increases its reliance on external equity financing, and hence the imperfect
observability diminishes the size of the banking sector.  However, from the first-order conditions
for the firm's investment decision, the scale of the firm also depends on the observation error.
When the error is an increasing function of the firm's allocation to the unobservable project, the
scale of the firm will generally decrease.  Thus, the shrinkage in the financial intermediary sector
comes about because b increases and I decreases.
Note also that, for projects where Cov (R3(s), J(s)) is negative, then the reverse holds.
thus, the size of the financial intermediary sector depends importantly on the direction (i.e., over
or under) of the misestimation by the monitor in the set of states where verification occurs.
This suggests that the financial intermediary sector is most likely to expand when
unobservable low-risk projects are likely to be undervalued in bankruptcy.  If one argues that17
many of the assets of financially distressed corporations have in fact been overvalued in today's
economy, then this analysis offers an explanation for the observed shrinkage in the size of the
financial intermediary sector recently.
4. The Role of the Monitoring Cost Function
In this section, we retain the assumption of perfect observability and focus on the
investment and financing implications of structural changes in the monitoring cost function.
There are several reasons why this approach is worth investigating.  First, general improvements
in technology, communications and innovation directly alter the cost effectiveness of direct
monitoring activity.  These changes will exert a twofold effect on the efficiency of intermediated
financial contracts.  Although the determinants of a bank's cost of monitoring are not well
understood, it seems reasonable to assert that recent advances in technology and communication
have reduced the costs of monitoring.  These changes may also have expanded the menu of cost
functions that banks can feasibly employ in their monitoring activities.  On the other hand,
similar innovations in the capital markets have undoubtedly reduced the costs of direct financial
contracting, thereby reducing the direct and indirect costs of alternative forms of financing.
We suppose that monitors can choose from a menu of feasible cost functions in
establishing a deterministic verification strategy with a particular firm.  For example, a particular
monitor could elect to implement a different verification strategy for different firms, with the
monitoring cost function chosen in response to certain firm specific characteristics.  The existing
literature generally ignores this possibility, as a given delegated monitor is assumed to employ
the same verification scheme for all firms.
In order to gain some insight into these issues, we examine two separate functional forms
for the monitoring cost.  Initially, we assume that the cost of monitoring depends only on the
firm's unobservable return component, Y(I2,s).  The rationale for a cost function of this form is
that there exists a direct linkage between the cost of verification and the state which is to be18
verified.  Let the cost of monitoring in this case be described by the function J ((YI2,s)).  We will
refer to this as an output contingent cost function.  We assume that  
2J
2Y  is positive and covex,
so that the cost of verification is an increasing function of the firm's unobservable output.  Thus,
higher aggregate unobservable output requires a costlier expenditure of resources by the monitor
to verify.
Alternatively, the cost of monitoring may depend directly on the configuration of the
firm's outstanding financial contracts, and hence indirectly on the firm's observable and
unobservable project returns.  This approach establishes a direct relationship between the amount
of resources expended on monitoring and the structure of the firm's financial contracts.  The
rationale is that insider behavior can be controlled directly by the process of verification, or
indirectly through the use of financial contracts.  That is, direct financial contracts induce certain
behavior while direct monitoring restricts certain behavior.  We assume that the firm's complete
structure of financial contracts is important in determining the total cost of verification, so that
the contractual allocation in both the verification region and the non-verification region matter.
While the appropriate design of financial contracts can help to align the diverse interests of
different claimant classes, we recognize that such contracts cannot always be constructed to
restore appropriate incentives under all conditions.  Hence, in this view, direct monitoring serves
to complement the incentive effects of the firm's direct financial contracts.  We utilize the
function  J[K(b, X(I1,s)), C(a, X(I1,s), Y(I2,s))] to represent the cost of monitoring in this case.
We refer to this as a contract contingent cost function.
We first consider the real and financial impact of the output contingent cost function.
The insiders' revised programming problem can be written as follows:19
24 Maximize S
c  XI1, s    YI2, s    K, X I1, s  ps  ds
    I,,,F
 S
 XI1, s    YI2, s    C, X I1, s,  I2, s ps  ds
subject to
25 O    P    X I1, s    Y I2, s
26  F    S
  X I1, s,  YI2,s     JYI2,s ps  ds 
      S
c  K, XI1, s  ps   ds    Eo
27    I  	 argmax  S
c  XI1 , s    YI2 ,s     K
, X I1 , s ps  ds
I  0
subject to
28 I1    I2    F
29 K
, X11,s,  C
,  XI1,s,  YI2,s      0
The following proposition demonstrates that a change from fixed cost verification
strategy to ether form of state contingent monitoring cost function has no impact on the insiders'
relative investment allocation decision.
Proposition    : The implementation of a state (i.e., output or contract) contingent monitoring
cost function does not affect the insider entrepreneurs' decision rule for
determining the optimal investment allocation across projects.
Proof: See Exhibit ______20
The intuition for the result stated in Proposition _____ follows immediately as a direct
consequence of the choice variables under consideration in our model and the way in which the
monitoring cost function enters the insider entrepreneurs' programming problem.  The adoption
of a state contingent monitoring cost function introduces an additional source of uncertainty into
the optimization problem.  This uncertainty manifests itself in the form of the cost and amount of
monitoring rather than through investment distortions.  Consequently, as the following
propositions indicate, the main impact of the state contingent monitoring cost function is through
the adjustment of financial contract characteristics and the verification region.
Proposition    : All else equal, the implementation of a state contingent monitoring cost
function leads to an increase in the size of the financial intermediary sector
and a decrease in the size of the direct contract market.
Proof: See Exhibit ______
Proposition    : The size of the financial intermediary sector under an output contingent
monitoring cost function is smaller than the size of the financial intermediary
sector under a contract contingent monitoring cost function.
Proof: See Exhibit _______
Thus, the form of the monitoring cost function in intermediated credit relationships is an
important determinant of the aggregate size  of the financial intermediary sector.  These results
provide some useful insights into the problem of credit rationing.  For example, Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) and Williamson (1986) demonstrate how contractual characteristics within a single
contract market adjust in equilibrium to ration credit.  In our model, with both direct and
intermediated contract markets arising endogenously, rationing can occur through adjustments in21
either market.  Our results suggest that, even if the level of aggregate investment decreases in our
model, the relative size of the intermediated contract market increases.
5. The Role of Stochastic Monitoring Strategies
A contractual arrangement based upon a deterministic verification policy pre-specifies the
set of outcomes over which monitoring occurs.  As a result, monitoring occurs with probability
one or zero.  An alternative agreement could entail a monitoring strategy in which the decision to
verify is random.  The advantage of the stochastic monitoring policy is that random procedures
reduce the expected costs of monitoring while the credible threat of a verification induces honest
reporting of the unobservable project's cash flow.  The net benefit of the random policy depends
on its effect on the firm's investment and financing decisions.  The purpose of this section is to
explore these implications.  Ultimately, the applicability of a stochastic verification policy may
depend on whether the process of information gathering is random or deterministic.
Townsend (1979) demonstrates the potential dominance of a stochastic verification
scheme over a deterministic verification policy through the use of an example.  Dye (1986)
investigates the feasibility of stochastic verification strategies in a standard principal-agent
framework, where monitoring reveals information about the agent's effort level.  However,
neither Townsend or Dye consider the financial contracting effects or the delegated monitoring
implications of the random strategy.
The notion of a stochastic monitoring policy certainly has appeal in a principal-agent
framework where supervisors are unable to costlessly observe subordinates' actions.  It is perhaps
less clear that such a verification scheme would work in a financial contracting framework.  This
perception is supported by Gale and Hellwig's (1985) intuitively appealing analysis of the
equivalence between the event of bankruptcy and costly monitoring in a deterministic
verification scheme.  However, we believe that it is not unrealistic to explore the implications of
stochastic monitoring in a financial contracting problem.  For example, the management of22
corporations operating under the protection of bankruptcy laws often set forth their own
reorganization plans.  Often times, creditors accept these terms, and hence (in our framework)
can be construed as not verifying the true value of the firm.  Furthermore, lenders often serve in
some advisory or directorship capacity (e.g., on a corporation's Board of Directors) and hence
gain knowledge of the firm's activities even in solvent states.
Thus, despite the intuitive appeal of the equivalence between bankruptcy and verification,
it is quite likely that the process of information gathering is more random in nature.  By
analyzing the simultaneous choice of financial contracts and stochastic monitoring policies, we
hope to gain further insights regarding the interaction between the incentive compatibility of
random state verification strategies.
The basic structure of the stochastic monitoring policy is as follows.  The end-of-period
payoffs to the firm's financial claimants depends in part on whether there is a verification, and the
latter is determined in a random way.  Specifically, the random investigation strategy is
represented by the function f(Y2,s)), where f(') is the probability of a verification contingent
upon the insiders' statements with respect to the realization of the firm's unobservable return
component.  The programming problem can now be written as follows:23
30 Maximize     fYI2,s  XI1,s    YI2,s    C,  XI1,s,  YI2,s	  
  1  fYI2,s  XI1,s    YI2,s    K
,  XI1,s 	   ps  ds
  
subject to
31 0      P      XI1,s    YI2,s
32 F     fYI2,s  C,  XI1,s,  YI2,s    
 	    1    fYI2,s   K
,  XI1,s	
ps  ds    Eo
33  1  argmax    fYI2,s   XI1,s    YI2,s    C, XI1,s, YI2,s 	
1  0
  1  fYI2,s  XI1,s    YI2,s    K
, XI1,s	   ps  ds
subject to 
34 I1     I2      F
35 C, XI1,s, YI2,s, K
, XI1,s      0
36 0      fYI2,s      1
Unfortunately, the nature of the firm's investment and contracting problem becomes quite
complex when we allow for a random monitoring policy.  This additional degree of freedom
dramatically enlarges the feasible contracting strategies available to the economic agents in our
model.  Our first result describes the general form f the random monitoring technology.
Proposition: The optimal random monitoring strategy is a lower-tail investigation policy.24
Proof: See Appendix _______.
The optimality of a lower-tail investigation strategy is relatively straightforward.  Low
output outcomes may be due to inappropriate investment decisions by the insider entrepreneurs.
By verifying all low output outcomes and keeping the firm's entire output in these states, outside
investors motivate insider entrepreneurs to choose optimal investment behavior.  Since high
output outcomes will generally not evidence distortionary investment allocations, these states are
not monitored.  Intuitively, outside investors discount the fact that, beyond the verification
region, insider entrepreneurs always declare the unobservable output Y(I2,s) to be low enough so
as to just avoid investigation.  Unobservability reduces the risk incentive problem because
insiders no longer gain at the expense of the firm's debt claimants.
As Appendix ____ indicates, however, the factors which influence the exact structure of
the random monitoring policy are quite complex.  In particular, the verification strategy depends
upon the following: (1) the firm's production technologies; (2) the available monitoring
technologies; (3) the firm's set of financial contracts; and (4) the state probabilities.  The
complexity of the verification strategy described is due to the fact that the additional restrictions
necessary for Proposition _____ are relatively minimal.  The remaining results described in this
section are obtained by imposing several additional restrictions.  In particular, e restrict our
derivation of the optimal monitoring policy to the class of all linear strategies.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Summary of Investment Project Characteristics
Observability
Project Investment Cash flow of Cash Flow Risk
1I 1 X (I1, s) Yes High
2I 2 Y (I2, s) No Low